Also on START

Fox News White House Correspondent Major Garret reported that the START Follow-on agreement is down to "the final sentences and paragraphs"

Two quick thoughts:

1. If it is true that a deal is imminent, then that's the worst news ever. It's very likely that the American negotiation team decided to give the Russians the moon at the negotiationg table.

2. Let's not overlook the fact that there's likely a lot of meaningful substance that can be still in those last few sentences and paragraphs.

The point was raised in the Heritage panels, below, but I'll echo it, here: since the START follow-on will likely not be ratified for several months after signing, and we'll be in an interregnum of pre-1987 conditions no matter what; we might as well have the moral confidence to temporarily walk away from these negotiations if we're giving away too much, and try this again, later, without the pressure of a self-imposed deadline to rid the world of nuclear weapons before the Nobel speech in Oslo.

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DSS Invades Heritage

Something to run in your background during your workday: Two Heritage Foundation panels on the START Treaty featuring DSS professors Andrei Shoumikhin and Keith Payne.

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START Follow-On Treaty Could Interfere With Conventional Strike Systems

The latest from Baker Spring at the Heritage Foundation. How's the paper coming along, David?

The Obama Administration is currently rushing to establish a treaty to succeed the expiring Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Early indications are that this neaw agreement will limit U.S. options to field conventionally armed missiles -- something Congress warned the Administration not to do.

Conventionally armed missiles provide the U.S. with a valuable option in protecting and defending the U.S. and its allies against strategic attack. Without this option, the U.S. would be more -- not less -- dependent on the nuclear-armed missiles in its strategic arsenal.

There have been several signs that this new treaty could curtail America's ability to field conventionally armed missiles, including provisions limiting the number of both delivery vehicles.

Specifically, the treaty negotiators have been instructed to limit the number of strategic-delivery vehicles -- intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers -- to between 500 and 1,100. These instructions were provided in a July 6 "joint understanding" between President Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev.

It appears that these delivery vehicles will be counted against the limit whether they carry nuclear or conventional warheads. This is not certain, however, because it is possible that the new treaty could use definitions that exclude conventionally armed, strategic-delivery vehicles -- particularly ones that are not currently in the U.S. arsenal.

Evan Moore is a graduate student at Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. His thesis is on the prospects for democratization of the Middle East.

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Untying Offensive and Defensive Systems

Before I get on with the content of this post, I want to sincerely apologize for the lack of content on DSSFeed. Most of us have been terribly busy with the semester hitting its peak work load. No excuses though. I know most of you hang on the edge of your seat for updates and I apologize for keeping you there - it must be quite uncomfortable.

As you probably know, there is a lot off buzz about the future the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. A bit of background -

The United States and Russia signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1991, effectively reducing the size of the United States and Soviet (now Russian Federation) strategic arms deployment. The subsequent Moscow treaty initiated further reductions, but relies solely on the verification regime of the initial START treaty. However, on December 5th of this year the START agreement will expire, thus rendering the Moscow treaty unverified until its expiration in 2012. In order to prevent a gap in verification, the administration has set a goal to renegotiate the START treaty, at least in part, by December 5th.

It is likely that there will be an interim agreement signed prior to December in order to provide an extension for a comprehensive agreement, which may take several years to negotiate and ratify.

There are some troubling rumblings coming out of the administration which make me question our dedication to primary and extended deterrence. Most notably was a joint statement issued on April 1st, in which both parties committed to negotiating the issue of the "interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms.”

I posit that there are four major reasons why tying offensive and defense strategic systems is bad for the security of the US.

1) It will effectively set a precedent for future agreements. After a treaty is ratified, it ascends to law higher than our constitutional. We may bind our hands in future agreements because of our carelessness during this one. We do not know the future of Missile Defense its true potential. Though it is not a perfect technology now, we may well have that technology one day. Be weary of entangling alliances.

2) Missile defense is crucial to deterring, and dissuading our opponents, particularly rogue states. It is too important to concede no matter who we are negotiating with. With Iran developing sophisticated warhead designs, and North Korea continuing to develop ICBM's, we will soon operate in a world in which those states can threaten the US mainland.

3) Both major strategic arms reduction treaties (START, SORT) we negotiated on the heels of a major advancement in missile defense (SDI, and the removal of the US from the ABM treaty). Missile defense allows us to negotiate in a position of strength.

4) Russia has not proven itself as a reliable partner in strategic arms control. Most notably, their testing of a modifed Topol M - the RS 24 violates START if it is deployed. They also seem to be channeling back deals with the Iranian regime which has undercut our effort to stifle the rogue nuclear program.

This is an important piece of language to watch for once START has been renegotiated. It may set the tone for future arms control treaties, and could even bind our ability to defend America from rogue missile threats.

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CSBA Pres. Krepinevich deprives DSS students of a thesis topic.

From DODBuzz - CSBA President Andrew Krepinevich has issued a report warning of a possible sharp increase in the number of nuclear states in the coming years, and reccommends that the US get serious in how to deal with it.

Key grafs from story -

[Krepinevich] describes the “Second Nuclear Regime,” where proliferation has moved from advanced industrial powers, centered around the U.S. and Europe, to emerging Asian states, such as India, Pakistan and North Korea, with more to follow: Iran, Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. A nuclear armed Iran would likely be a proliferation “tipping point,” where the barriers to proliferation disappear altogether, producing a domino-effect as Arab states wanting “peaceful” nuclear power, what Krepinevich calls the “starter kit” for nuclear weapons, accelerate weaponization efforts.

In such a world, strategists and military leaders must go further than just ruminating about how deterrence theory can be jerry rigged to fit a larger set of nuke wielding actors. Military planners must prepare to fight on a day-after-nuclear-explosion battlefield, he says, a warfighting environment (including radioactive contamination and potential second strike) of such complexity and potential cost, it renders obsolete many basic tenets of U.S. military power projection. How for example, do you locate your primary fighter strike force at bases in the Gulf, such as Doha, within easy range of Iran’s nuclear tipped missiles?

After having observed the importance American commanders placed on “force protection” when faced with guerrillas armed with roadside bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan, it’s difficult to imagine a scenario where those same commanders would send troops into harms way against a nuclear armed opponent. Yet, as Krepinevich points out, if, as is likely, proliferation becomes reality, the U.S. cannot be frozen out of options by the threat of nuclear strike. Somehow, policymakers and military commanders must be provided options for strategic maneuver, even with the threat of nuclear attack hanging over their heads.

Planning for a campaign against a nuclear armed regional adversary must include some combinations of missile defenses, long range strike assets to take out nuclear weapons and special operations, or larger, forces that can seize and render a safe a hostile state’s nuclear arsenal. Of course, in a proliferated world, an added danger is that some terrorist group gets their hands on a nuke. In such a world, the ability to “track back” a nuclear detonation, to identify “nuclear fingerprints,” will be absolutely vital.

Good luck on that last part.

Read the whole thing. Because I didn't.


Evan Moore is a graduate student at Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. He is currently writing his thesis on the prospects for democratization of the Middle East. Really. Swear.

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Dr. Payne in the next National Review

Heads-up: the November 2, 2009 edition of the National Review features a piece by DSS's own lord and master, Dr. Keith Payne. Here's the cover, and a link to the NR-Digital site.



Also featured is a piece from Jamie Fly, the executive director of the Foreign Policy Initiative (where, again, I interned for over the summer).


Evan Moore is a graduate student at Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. He is currently writing his thesis on the prospects for democratization of the Middle East.

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Just came across the wire

The Foreign Policy Initiative (which is a great outfit based in DC) has put out another open letter, this time joining with the Center for European Policy Analysis urging President Obama to reiterate and reforge America's relationship with Poland and the Czech Republic in the wake of the late-unpleasantness with the Third Site.

WASHINGTON October 2, 2009 -- A distinguished group of foreign policy experts today urged President Barack Obama to reiterate America’s commitment to its Central European allies and improve the U.S. defense relationship with the Czech Republic, Poland and those countries’ neighbors. In an open letter to President Obama, the bipartisan group of signatories echo concerns expressed by a group of Central European leaders earlier this year about growing perceptions of U.S. disengagement from Central Europe. The letter requests that Obama pursue opportunities to place U.S. strategic assets on Polish and Czech soil and increase defense cooperation with allies in the region. The letter also urges the White House to “send a clear message about the depth and sincerity of America’s engagement in this region that shares our values and is vital to our security.”

The signatories are: Elliott Abrams, Max Boot, Seth Cropsey, Thomas Donnelly, Jamie M. Fly, Richard W. Graber, Brian Green, Jakub Grygiel, Larry Hirsch, Robert Kagan, David J. Kramer, William Kristol, Charles W. Larson, Robert J. Lieber, Tod Lindberg, Thomas G. Mahnken, Michael Makovsky, Clifford D. May, A. Wess Mitchell, Martin Peretz, Peter Podbielski, David Satter, Randy Scheunemann, Gary Schmitt, Dan Senor, Simon Serfaty, Marc Thiessen, William Tobey, David J. Trachtenberg, Ken Weinstein, and Leon Wieseltier.

Earlier this month, the administration canceled plans to place missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. The sites were intended to respond to the threat posed by Iran’s missile and nuclear programs.

Full text of the letter can be found here. Key paragraphs:

We urge you to reiterate America's commitment to these allies that have endured Russian intimidation in support of the United States and a shared commitment to democracy. One way to do this is to move quickly to ensure that some of the land-based SM-3 missile defense sites your administration is proposing will be placed on Polish and Czech soil. Further, the United States should leave the door open to deploying Ground Based Interceptors should a long-range missile threat from Iran materialize sooner than you anticipate and alternative technologies not be available to defend against it. The planned deployment of a U.S. Patriot battery to Poland should proceed without delay, and similar arrangements should be explored with other allies in the region. We also encourage you to explore other ways to improve the U.S. defense relationship with both countries as well as their neighbors, including increased U.S. support for defense modernization efforts.

In July, a group of Central European leaders addressed to you, in an open letter, their concerns about the weakening state of U.S. relations with their region. "When it comes to Russia," they wrote, "our experience has been that a more determined and principled policy toward Moscow will not only strengthen the West's security but will ultimately lead Moscow to follow a more cooperative policy." Mr. President, our friends' advice is sound. Their wisdom has been earned both under the thumb of Soviet rule and in the shadow of today's more assertive Kremlin.

Polish and Czech leaders supported U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan despite heavy criticism. Though the signatories of this bipartisan letter have varying views on the merits of your administration's proposed missile defense architecture for Europe, we are united in our concern about the effect that even the perception of U.S. disengagement from Central Europe could have on our allies in the region. Supporters of the United States should not have to gamble on the staying power - or the commitment - of American leadership. We urge you to make every effort to ensure that Moscow does not conclude that America retreats in the face of threats to its most loyal allies.

Full disclosure - I interned with FPI over the summer.

Evan Moore is a graduate student at Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. He is currently writing his thesis on the prospects for democratization of the Middle East.

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On Iranian missile system development

John Noonan at The Weekly Standard's blog has a great review of the status of Iran's missile system development. It's not written in DC wonk-speak, so it serves as a pretty good place for people who don't live, breathe, and eat this stuff to jump in, and understand the parameters of the situation:

A reader emails: The government is playing down Iran's missile tests as scantly more than "provocative," while some political pundits are calling them gravely serious. What's the real story? Just how far along are they in [missile] development?


Short skinny: It's serious.

Iran's test provides some useful insight into where the regime sees itself in 6-8 years -- as a proven nuclear power with full deterrence capabilities. The fuel they used, for example, is in itself destabilizing. Iran has traditionally powered their rockets with volatile liquid fuel. Because liquid rocket fuel is unstable, their rockets required significant preparation immediately before the ignition sequence. That's why you see headlines screaming about a North Korean missile launches weeks before they actually happen -- intelligence services can detect activity at launch sites well ahead of scheduled tests. Liquid fuel also "sloshes" in its tank, which destabilizes trajectory. Solid fuel burns evenly and remains steady during flight, which is why Russia, China, and the United States all use it in their various ICBM booster systems.

Full deployment of solid-fuel boosters would give Iran a "launch-on-warning" capability that they've never had before, as it's stable enough to store without significant prep time. That means the old paradigm, where Middle East tensions would escalate to the point that Iran started fueling their rockets in response to a tactical or strategic threat, is gone. Now, if the United States or Israel were to hit Iran conventionally, we'd have to hit 100 percent of their rockets with an initial, coordinated surprise attack -- an unlikely scenario, even considering the unmatched abilities of our Navy and Air Force.

The second concerning aspect of the test is Iran's further use of staging technology. The Minuteman III ICBM uses three solid fuel stages to boost the missile into orbit, then a manageable amount of liquid fuel to guide the nuclear reentry system into a safe release point. The hybrid system optimizes both range and accuracy. Iran's not quite there yet, but they've got the basics down with the first and second stages.

Yesterday's test proves that Iran has figured out both staging and solid fuel technology. The next logical step is to combine the two, yielding a fully functional ICBM. Couple that with a nuclear reentry system (thankfully not an easy technology to master), and Iran will have a full nuclear deterrent similar to the United States and Russia during the Cold War.

The idea of Iran using its terrorist proxies under the aegis of nuclear ICBMs and MRMBs is chilling. And President Obama has now cut a critical component of our contingency plan against this scenario -- European missile defense.

Evan Moore is a graduate student at Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. He is currently writing his thesis on the prospects for democratization of the Middle East.

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Posted without comment.

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COIN in Afghanistan is a heads-or-tails game in DC

David -

Thanks for bringing me onboard.

- Evan

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Fred and Kim Kagan, from AEI and the Institute for the Study of War, respectively, have recently released an analysis of the situation in Afghanistan, and called for an additional 40-45,000 troops to be added next year to supplement the 68,000 American forces that will be there by the end of 2009. The Kagans were part of Gen. McChrystal's strategy assessment team, and their recommendations square-up with what other guys on the panel have publicly been saying, including Anthony Cordesman and Bruce Riedel. They also, famously, released a similar report in the prelude to the surge in Iraq, and also served in an advisory capacity to Gen. Petraeus with Gen. Jack Keane before that report was issued, as well.

Word has filtered down that Gen. McChrystal has prepared three options to deal with the situation that he outlined in his assessment, within the framework of the strategy that the President announced back in March. That formal request for additional forces has not yet been formally submitted, media sources have picked it up. McChrystal's "high risk" option is on the order of 15k additional troops, the "medium risk" is of somewhere on the order of 25K, and the "low risk" - which is COIN by the book - is on the order of 45,000.

However, the Beltway media is abuzz with news that the Obama Administration has gulped pretty hard at the situation, and we've seen messages coming out of the White House that they're trying to come up with an alternative strategy, or find a way to get out, altogether. Christian Brose at the Shadow Government blog of Foreign Policy magazine posits that given the weight of his public committment to the fight in Afghanistan in the campaign, and his instinctive addition of troops this year before Gen. McKiernan was fired and McChrystal sent in his stead, the President is trying to give the appearance that he is weighing every concievable option before going forward with COIN-by-the-book. This would concievably help placate his liberal base, and give the public the impression that he isn't just ordering a dramatic escalation of an unpopular war for the hell of it.

Unfortunately, I don't think that the politics for the President will bear out like that. For one, his base in Congress is pretty dead-set against any further troop increases. His base in the liberal movement is equally dead-set against them, as well. His political team (Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel has been specifically mentioned) is making continual Vietnam parallels, saying that he risks being another Johnson - a domestic-policy liberal that got caught up in an unpopular war, and wasn't able to do as much as he wanted to on the domestic front. With the President losing suppport from political independents, and disapproval ratings for the war in Afghanistan around 60% angering your base doesn't strike me as the expedient thing to do.

Subseqently, we've heard that the White House is looking at alternative strategies - mainly, the increased use of Predator and cruise missile strikes to "focus" on al-Qaeda rather than the Taliban - as if the two weren't intermingled and intermarried by this point, anyway. Unfortunately, this policy is unworkable, as Michael O'Hanlon and Bruce Riedel point out - we'd lost what intelligence sources we'd have, as well as basing rights in the face of an angry (or non-existant) Afghan government. Furthermore, as the experience of the 1998 cruise missile attack shows, striking from several hundred miles away is a bit of a non-starter when your target can move around and your missiles take a long time to arrive.

As General McChrystal has pointed out, the current situation is deteriorating, and current levels are inadequate. So, in regards to Afghanistan, President Obama is left with, essentially, a choice of double-or-nothing. His first choice would be extraordinarily difficult to get, his second would lead to absolute disaster, but has the percieved-value of being politically expedient.

While we're drawing parallels to the past, I would offer another one to the President while he makes his decision. This comes from a talk that I had this summer with a well-known political commentator who has served in previous Republican administrations. In the health-care fight at the beginning of the Clinton Administration, polling data looked pretty shaky for Republicans, and it looked like something big might actually be passed. Then, in early October of 1994, there was the infamous "Blackhawk Down" battle in Somalia, and network television was flooded with the horrific sight of American servicemen being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Afterwards, Clinton's poll numbers began to decline, and health care (then) was defeated.

I don't like making political points out of things like this, but there is a point that has to be made: a President is judged, holistically, on the performance of his administration. The fruits of his foreign policy - and anything that might incidentally occur on his watch - does impact Congress and the public's willingness to go along with his domestic agenda. Mr. Obama would be well-served to take heed of that advice, and not pursue a policy that undermines everything that Americans have fought and died for for 8 years. Afghanistan is not a far-away land of which we know little, it is where the murder of 3,000 Americans was concieved. It is time for the President to be the commander in chief, and fight and win a war based on what is militarily necessary, not by what poll numbers or Rasputin-esque political operatives tell him to do.

Roll the hard six, Mr. President.


Evan Moore is a graduate student at Missouri State University's Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. He is currently writing his thesis on the prospects for democratization of the Middle East.

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